Annals of Health Law
Volume 19
Issue 1 Special Edition 2010

Article 43

2010

The Difficulty of Doing Business with Stark in an
Ever-Changing and Overly Complex Regulatory
Environment: After Twenty-Years, Where Are We
Heading
Irvin "Ham" Wagner
Cin & Wagner

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Irvin ". Wagner The Difficulty of Doing Business with Stark in an Ever-Changing and Overly Complex Regulatory Environment: After
Twenty-Years, Where Are We Heading, 19 Annals Health L. 241 (2010).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss1/43

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annals of Health Law by an authorized
administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Wagner: The Difficulty of Doing Business with Stark in an Ever-Changing a

The Difficulty of Doing Business With Stark in an

Ever-Changing and Overly Complex Regulatory
Environment: After Twenty Years, Where
Are We Heading?
Irvin "Ham" Wagner*
"What is needed is what lawyers call a bright line rule to give providers
and physicians unequivocal guidance as to the arrangements that are
prohibited. If the law is clear and the penalties are substantial, we can
rely on self-enforcement. Few physicians will knowingly break the law.
The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act provides this bright line rule."
Congressman Pete Stark, 19891
I. INTRODUCTION

With all eyes on the Obama administration's push
for an overhaul of the United States healthcare
system, one milestone in connection with prior
attempts at regulatory reform recently passed with
little notice or celebration. Last year marked the
twentieth anniversary of the enactment of "The
Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989,,,2 also known
as "The Physician Self-Referral Prohibition Law" or
simply, "Stark," named for its sponsor, Congressman
Fortney "Pete" Stark of California. A critical look at
Stark might serve as a warning to Congress should it wish to avoid the
creation of another layer of healthcare regulation comprising wide-reaching
* J.D., Chicago Kent College of Law; LL.M., Loyola University Chicago School of Law
where he focused on the Stark Law for his LL.M: thesis. Mr. Wagner currently practices at
the Chicago law firm of Cin & Wagner which is a general civil and commercial law firm.
1. 135 CONG. REC. H240-01 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (Statement of Rep. Stark).
2. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 6204, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2106 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This version of the statute is referred to
as "Stark I" because it was replaced by the current version of the statute, which is sometimes
referred to as "Stark II." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13562, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified in relevant part at Social Security Act § 1877, 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn (2008)).
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and overly complex rules that are: (i) in need of continuous revision; (ii)
understood by few; and (iii) chilling in their effect on the practice of
medicine.
II. THE SELF-REFERRAL PROHIBITION: ITS CORE ELEMENTS

Reduced to its essence, Stark prohibits a physician from making a
"referral" for a patient to an entity for the furnishing of an item or service
that falls within one of eleven types of "designated health services" (DHS)
covered by Medicare or Medicaid if the physician (or immediate family
member) has a financial relationship with the entity furnishing the service,
or unless a statutory or regulatory exception applies. Stark also prohibits
the entity furnishing the DHS from submitting a claim for reimbursement,
or otherwise billing Medicare, Medicaid, or any other person or entity for
the prohibited referral.3

When Stark first became law in 1989 (Stark I), 4 the "self-referral"
prohibition was limited to clinical laboratory services. Shortly after the
statute took effect, its reach was dramatically expanded (Stark I) 5 to
include the following eleven categories of DHS currently fall within the
scope of the prohibition: clinical laboratory services, physical therapy
services, occupational therapy services, radiology services including
magnetic resonance imaging, computerized axial tomography scans, and
ultrasound services; radiation therapy services and supplies, durable
medical equipment and supplies, parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment
and supplies, prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies;
home health services, outpatient prescription drugs, and inpatient and
outpatient hospital services.6 Considering that all inpatient and outpatient
hospital services are included, the list is quite expansive.
Today, four categories of financial relationships implicate the
prohibition: (i) a direct ownership or investment interest in the DHS entity;
(ii) an indirect ownership or investment interest in the entity; (iii) a direct
compensation arrangement with the entity; and (iv) an indirect
compensation arrangement with the entity.7 The definitions of these four
types of relationships are not only complex, but they have also been subject
to change over the past twenty years.
Generally, a physician's (or family member's) ownership or investment
relationship with the DHS entity either through equity or debt triggers the
prohibition; this also includes an interest in an entity that holds an
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Social Security Act of 1935 § 1877(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (a) (2008).
Supra note 2.
Id.
§ 1877(h)(6), § 1395nn (h)(6); 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2009).
§ 1877 (a)(2), § 1395nn (a)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (2008).
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ownership or investment interest in any other DHS entity. 8 A compensation
arrangement invokes Stark when most anything of value is exchanged
between a physician (or family member) and the entity. In addition to
financial remuneration, which may be paid as a salary, stipend or rental
payment, anything of value such as a gift, meal, invitation to a picnic or
party, or even a free continuing education class falls within the prohibition.
Presently, thirty-three Stark exceptions permit an otherwise prohibited
referral-nine "general" exceptions involving ownership or investment and
10
9
compensation relationships, three ownership or investment exceptions,
and twenty-one compensation exceptions.11 Fourteen of the exceptions
were initially created by the statute, 12 while the others have been created by
regulation.' 3 The exceptions focus primarily on the terms of the financial
relationship between the physician (or family member) and the entity to
which the physician is making the referral. Since the general prohibition is
so broad, the exceptions have become the rule; otherwise, almost no
referrals would be permitted.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FROM WHICH STARK EMERGED
Prior to the enactment of Stark, the Anti-Kickback Statute1 4 had served
as the government's main weapon against Medicare fraud and abuse. The
Anti-Kickback Statute is an intent-based criminal statute that outlaws
"kickbacks" or remuneration of any kind in exchange for patient referrals.
Congressman Stark argued that although the Anti-Kickback Statute
"reflect[ed] a firm resolve that patients should not be bought or
sold... clever deal makers have found a loophole." "Referral schemes,"
according to him, "[were] being disguised as legitimate business
arrangements, most commonly as partnerships involving referring
physicians, but also as consulting or similar arrangements." The intent of
the parties was "quite clear," he said, "to lock-in referrals by creating a web
of financial relationships binding the referring physicians to the provider." 15
Mr. Stark complained that the Anti-Kickback Statute was ineffective at
eliminating this form of fraud and abuse because of the difficulty in proving
8. This prohibition, however, does not apply in instances where publicly traded
securities or bonds or ownership of shares in a large regulated investment company with
assets exceed $75,000,000.
9. § 1877 (b), § 1395nn (b); 42 C.F.R. § 411.355 (2007).
10. § 1877 (c), § 1395nn (c); 42 C.F.R. § 411.356 (2007).
11. § 1877 (d), § 1395nn (d); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357 (2009).
12. § 1877 (b), (c) and (d); § 1395nn (b),(c) and (d) (2008).
13. 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.355 -. 357.
14. Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act ("The Anti-Kickback Statute"), 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
15. Supra note 1.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2010

3

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 43

244

Annals of Health Law - 25th Anniversary Special Edition [Vol. 19

a particular relationship was intentionally structured to induce referrals, and
because the Government lacked sufficient resources to undertake
prosecutions. 16
He suggested to Congress that his bill would effectively target the three
evils he believed arose out of self-referrals: compromised patient care,
overutilization of services, and unfair competition. First, according to the
Congressman, there was a risk that physician investors would not refer
patients to the facility that provided the best care. Rather, the physician
might refer patients to the facility with which the physician had financial
relationships. Second, he stated patients might be referred for costly
services that are unnecessary, and he cited government and academic
studies which revealed higher utilization rates where physicians had
financial ties with the providers. Third, he argued that "honest competition
is undercut" by self-referrals, and he complained "suppliers are being
forced to compete-not on price or quality-but on the cut they give
' 17
physicians."
Finally, he promoted his bill under the premise that it would provide
regulation through clear bright line tests that would enable physicians to
determine what exactly they may and may not do. Passage of his bill,
according to Mr. Stark, would put an end to the "deal makers" and attorneys
who put on seminars teaching people how to exploit new loopholes and
since the proposed bill was to be a strict liability statute, the government
would no longer need to prove violations were intentional.
IV.

THE EVER-CHANGING NATURE OF STARK

The statute was enacted in 1989 (Stark I) and it was amended in 1993
(Stark I).18 Since Stark II took effect, rules have been issued in ongoing
phases in an attempt to fill in the many gaps left by the statute. Regulations
were needed to clarify or expand the statutory definitions and exceptions as
well as to create additional ones.
Proposed regulations implementing Stark II were first published in 1998,
five years after the statute was enacted. 19 Many criticized the government
for the length of time it took to propose regulations, and the Stark II Phase I
Final Regulations were not released until 2001. The Phase I Regulations
were not comprehensive, but were intended to be the first part of a
bifurcated final rulemaking with additional regulations following. The
Phase II Regulations were released and took effect in 2004.20 Three years
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Supra note 1.
Id.
Supra note 2.
Social Security Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659 (1998).
Social Security Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 16054, 16121 (Mar. 26, 2004).
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later, in 2007, the Phase III Regulations were released and for the most part,
they took effect later that year.21 The Phase III Regulations were designed
to respond to public comments from Phase II, and they address the entire
regulatory scheme. These three phases of rulemaking were intended to be
read as a whole; though they and their accompanying commentary are
voluminous and confusing and have not served as the last word.
Rulemakings and revisions have also been included with the Medicare
billing requirements on an ongoing basis. Each year CMS publishes the
Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) Final Rule and the Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (HIPPS) Final Rule which, amidst hundreds
of pages, set forth the charges, codes and policies for Medicare billing
during the following year. Important Stark issues are frequently raised in
both the PFS and HIPPS rules. Most recently, in August of 2008 very
significant changes to Stark were announced in the 2009 HIPPS Final Rule
wherein portions of the Phase I, II and III regulations were reversed. 22
After twenty years of trying to get Stark right, regulators continue to
struggle with many aspects of this law, which they often find either in need
of further tightening or loosening to redress the unintended consequences of
a prior rulemaking. As a result, the Stark II rulemakings are scattered
throughout various pronouncements.
New regulations are often
inconsistent with prior versions, and they have required the restructuring of
many arrangements that were previously considered to be compliant with
the law. In addition, disputes arising out of the interpretation of various
provisions have begun to percolate into the nation's courthouses.
Also frustrating to the industry is CMS's habit of threatening changes it
never finalizes. This habit leaves providers in a state of limbo, often for
years, and it stifles investment in new technology. Yet, CMS makes no
apologies. Rather, it describes its ad hoc approach as "measured and
thoughtful," with the goal of "addressing program integrity concerns as they
arise;" and the only thing it seems to indicate with certainty is that more
change is to come. Indeed, the continuously changing character of this law
is so widely recognized that it has become standard practice when drafting
agreements that involve Stark issues to include clauses that permit the
unwinding or restructuring of arrangements should the law change, yet
again. When is enough enough?
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING BUSINESS WITH STARK

Aside from the problem that the ever-changing character of this law
makes compliance a challenge similar to shooting a moving target, Stark

21.
22.

Social Security Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 51012 (Sept. 5, 2007).
Social Security Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 48688 (Aug. 19, 2008).
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roundly fails to fulfill its mission of providing easily understood bright line
tests. While some components of the compensation exceptions are black
and white and do include clear requirements such as the requirement that an
agreement last for one year or be memorialized in a writing signed by the
parties, other sections, which intend to offer greater flexibility, do not set
out the bright line rules Mr. Stark envisioned. Consequently, the burden of
proof to establish compliance, which falls on the provider, becomes more
difficult to satisfy. Some exceptions, such as the "Fair Market Value
Compensation Exception" require that the arrangement is "consistent with
fair market value," "commercially reasonable," and that it "furthers the
legitimate business purposes of the parties" in order to get around the
prohibition.23 Yet, these concepts, like beauty, may be in the eye of the
beholder, and can easily lend themselves to different interpretations and, of
course, to trouble. Simply ask the folks at Tenet.
24
In other sections, such as the In-Office Ancillary Services Exception
which addresses what referrals a physician may make within the office, the
tests and definitions as to what constitutes "in the office" or within a
physician "group" are enormously difficult to understand, and it should be
asked whether this is fair and appropriate for a strict liability statute.
VI. CONCLUSION: A WARNING WITH RESPECT TO
FUTURE EFFORTS AT REFORM

One hears that a growing number of physicians no longer wish to treat
Medicare patients, and that our nation's seniors are having difficulty finding
physicians.2 5 Other physicians are enrolling in law school. This is, in part,
the result of the increased regulation placed over them, and Stark deserves
considerable blame for this. Physicians feel they are unduly constrained by
a system that is too vast, too intrusive, and too complicated for them to
understand. They are opposed to a strict regulatory framework that only
addresses their financial relationships and leaves them no room to infuse
professional judgment; and they are fearful of a regulatory environment
where the failure to strictly comply with every aspect of the law-even
inadvertently-can lead to disastrous consequences ranging from enormous
fines to program exclusion.
Few clear trends have emerged from the rulemakings, and policy has
shifted back and forth from accommodative to restrictive. It appears likely

23. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(1) (2009).
24. Social Security Act § 1877 (b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (b) (2008); 42 C.F.R. §
411.355(b) (2007).
25. Chris L. Jenkins, The Doctor Is Out,WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at HEO, available
at
http:www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/05/AR2008120503196.html.
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this process will carry on ad infinitum, and at great expense to industry
providers unless action is taken by Congress. Although some regulation of
financial relationships between physicians and providers to whom they refer
patients is necessary and appropriate, a more stable and limited approach is
called for.
The difficulty of doing business with Stark these past two decades should
serve as a warning with respect to current and future attempts at healthcare
reform.
Unnecessarily complex and overly restrictive regulatory
intervention does not adapt well to evolving technologies, nor does it lead
to efficiencies in the marketplace. Sadly, as our legislators embark on a
new journey toward healthcare reform with the current political headwinds
at their back, it appears likely Congress will cobble together more sweeping
legislation that is filled with many holes. Bureaucrats will be left with
another mess that will not only require decades to clean up, but will drive
more physicians away from the practice of medicine.
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